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Morality versus Slogans
I am not going to say anything that everyone
doesn't already know. I think of myself as simply
making explicit some points that people may have
overlooked, and clarifying some points that are
confusing because people may not have taken enough
time to think about them sufficiently. I don't offer
myself as any kind of authority. Philosophy is not
science. Philosophers do not discover new facts in
the way that some scientists do, or even historians,
and which most of us simply have to accept on their
authority. One should never accept anything any
philosopher says simply on his authority.
Philosophy is not religion, it provides no new faith of
its own, at least I do not. Other philosophers can
speak for themselves, but I consider myself to be in
the Socratic tradition. I am simply a midwife whose
task is to help others deliver their own thoughts more
clearly and precisely.
In order to do this I must show you that you
do not really accept some of the views that you think
you accept. But before I do this, I want to make a
few things clear. I am not a moral skeptic or moral
relativist. In fact I accept all of the standard moral
views; I regard killing, cheating, etc., as bad, and
relieving pain, helping people, etc., as good. My
------------------------------------3
positive views about morality are so ordinary that I
expect everyone to agree with everything I have to
say, to wonder why I even bother to say it. I don't
intend to say anything at all controversial, and if I
seem to do so that will be because I haven't expressed
myself clearly enough. I am completely superficial,
everything is on the surface and if I seem to say
anything profound, then I have been misunderstood.
This goes for my positive views as well as my
criticisms of others. I am saying this all right at the
start so you won't expect anything controversial or
profound in what follows.
THE GOLDEN RULE
First, to show you how non-controversial my
views are, I am going to discuss the Golden Rule,
"Do unto others as you would have them do unto
you. " Most people claim that they think: the Golden
Rule is a good principle by which to live. But
consider the following case: I am sleeping in my
bedroom in Hanover, New Hampshire--a little town,
and I don't lock my doors. Tonight that seems to be a
mistake because I am awakened by a noise
downstairs. I go out of the bedroom and look down
over the balcony and there is a burglar frantically
trying to find something of value and stuffing various
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items into a bag. I see him but he doesn't see or
hear me. I go back in my room where I have a
telephone and I am about to call the police. All of a
sudden I think of the Golden Rule. Should I hang up
the phone and go to bed? That's what the Golden
Rule says to do, doesn't it? There is no question at all
that if I were a burglar I certainly wouldn't want
anyone to call the police on me! Therefore if I act
according to the Golden Rule I should not call the
police on this burglar. That's what the Golden Rule
tells us. You might object that the burglar himself is
not following the Golden Rule. He would not want
me to rob his house, so he is not following the
Golden Rule. That is correct, but the Golden Rule
does not say "Do unto others as you would have them
do unto you unless they have done unto you what
they would not want done unto them." So the Golden
Rule seems to tell you not to report the burglar. "Oh
come on" you say, "there is something wrong with
that interpretation." But I have simply given the
Golden Rule a straightforward reading and on that
reading it really is a silly rule. The only reason that
people still think it is any good is that they haven't
really thought about it at all.
Consider an example where son:eone has not
done anything wrong. An encyclopedia salesman
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comes to the door and wants to sell you an
encyclopedia. What do you have to do if you want to
follow the Golden Rule? You have to buy it. Once
the other salesmen in town know you follow the
Golden Rule, you are going to have everyone of them
at your front door too. I can tell you from experience,
because I used to sell encyclopedias, that there is no
question of what encyclopedia salesmen want. Given
that they want you to buy, if you accept that you
should do unto others what you want others to do
unto you, then you have to buy the encyclopedias.
You can even imagine a sophisticated use of the
Golden Rule in the ongoing dialogue between the
sexes, where the boy says to the girl, "The Golden
Rule says you should do unto me what...", and the
girl says, "Well, you should do unto me .... ", and
then the boy says, "Well I said it first."
After consideration, everyone realizes that the
Golden Rule is not really a very good guide to
conduct. It seems to require conduct that everybody
admits is not required and sometimes seems to require
conduct that is clearly wrong. If followed literally,
and how else are we to understand it, it requires all
normal policemen not to arrest criminals, and all
normal judges not to sentence them. Assuming that
normal judges and policemen want neither to be
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caught nor sentenced, according to the Golden Rule,
it follows that they ought not to arrest or sentenced
others. The Golden Rule also requires, and students
might like this, that teachers not give flunking grades
to students even if they deserve it. If you were a
student you would not want to be flunked. But it also
seems to require that a student get a better grade than
those who do not deserve it, because if you were a
student and deserved a better grade, you would want
a better grade. So it now seems that the Golden Rule
is really pretty useless if you are trying to find out
what you ought to do.
The Golden Rule does have some useful
functions for children, e.g., a six year-old girl who
starts beating-up on her little four year-old brother,
taking his toy away at the same time. So you say to
her, "Would you like someone to beat-up on you and
take away your toy?" She says, "No." Then you
say, "Well do not do it to others" Of course
everyone knows it was wrong to beat up on a kid and
take his toy. So the Golden Rule seems, even here,
to be merely a rhetorical device and is not any help at
all in finding out what you ought to do. The Golden
Rule doesn't tell you anything that you don't already
know except in cases where it tells you the wrong
thing. It is really a useless and pointless rule to use as
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a guide to your conduct because it really doesn't tell
you how you ought to act in any cases in which you
have any doubt.
I am not denying that the Golden Rule, in
some cases, tells us to do the moral thing. What I am
saying is that in those cases, you already knew what
was immoral before you applied the Golden Rule. If
you are wondering whether to kill somebody, you
don't need that Golden Rule to tell you, "I wouldn't
want to be killed, therefore I shouldn't kill him. " You
knew it was wrong to kill him before you applied the
Golden Rule. The Golden Rule is of no help at all
because it gives you the wrong answers as often as it
give you the right ones. Using procedures that are
not very reliable, that sometimes give you the right
answer but just as often give you the wrong answer,
is not very useful.
THE TEN COMMANDMENTS
Having shown the inadequacy of the Golden
Rule, let us consider the Ten Commandments. You
may remember that some people, even former
President Reagan, regard the Ten Commandments as
a list of completely universal moral rules that should
be accepted by everyone as their guide to morality.
He recommended that they be posted on the bulletin
E3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
boards of all of the schools. But it is very doubtful
that he knew all the Ten Commandments. Some
know one or two, but very few know all ten. In fact,
there are several different versions. For example,
Luther has one version and Calvin has another even
though they are very similar. Do the Ten
Commandments really provide an adequate and
universal moral guide? Some of the Ten
Commandments may not be moral rules at all. For
example, it is not clear whether the rule against
worshipping idols has anything to do with morality. I
am not in favor of worshipping idols. I do not,
never have, never will, but not everything that we are
against is necessarily immoral. I do not believe that
worshipping idols has anything to do with morality.
But because I don't want to make any claim that may
be controversial, I shall ignore the question of
whether worshipping idols is a moral matter.
Let us now consider the commandment
against coveting thy neighbor's wife. It is a little
sexist. It does not say anything about not coveting
thy neighbor's husband, for it was addressed to men,
not women, but that is not my concern here. It says,
"Don't covet thy neighbor's wife" and then
continues, "or his house, or his oxen, or his ass, or
his manservant or his maidservant." Manservants and
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maidservants are polite translations of "male and
female slaves." So in the official statement of one of
the commandments it says don't covet thy neighbor's
slaves, male or female, which seems to condone
slavery. "Don't covet your neighbor's slaves" does
not sound like a universal moral rule. Nor is it the
kind of rule we want posted on every schoolroom
bulletin board. Maybe this explains the Reagan
administration's policy on South Africa. One might
object, "No, no, no, it tells you not to covet slaves,
so it's really against slavery." This objection is not
very strong for it would lead one to say that because it
tells you not to covet wives it has to be against
marriage. Even if one grants this completely
inadequate defense, it's of no avail because
unfortunately there is another Commandment that
clearly does not count as a completely universal moral
rule. If any of the Ten Commandments allows
immoral behavior then we cannot use the Ten
Commandments as a guide to the moral life. A guide
which we know is sometimes wrong is clearly of no
use to us in settling doubtful cases.
Those who know the Ten Commandments
know the immoral commandment: "But the seventh
day is the sabbeth of the Lord thy God. In it thou
shall not do any work, thou, nor thy son, nor thy
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daughter, nor thy manservant, nor thy maidservant,
nor thine oxen, nor thine ass, nor any of thy cattle,
nor any stranger who is within thy gates. That thy
manservant and maidservant shall rest as well as
thou" (Deuteronomy V:14). This commandment
recommends the humane treatment of slaves. So it
was a big advance over the practice of the times.
Even the Greek philosophers Plato and Aristotle
thought there were natural slaves. Aristotle said:
"There are natural rulers and natural slaves." You can
see that I am not just attacking ancient religion; ancient
philosophers were no better. Nowadays we know
better. We know that slavery is wrong. Even
humane slavery, if that is possible. So even if the
commandment about giving the slaves a day off is an
improvement over the practice of the time, which it
certainly was, nobody would accept it as expressing a
timeless, universally acceptable moral rule. Imagine
posting this is on your bulletin board: "Give your
slaves a day off." Is that the kind of commandment
we would want posted in the schoolroom as President
Reagan recommends? I do not deny that some of the
Ten Commandments are perfectly good moral rules,
e.g., "Do not kill." It actually doesn't say that but
you can interpret it that way. All I am saying is that
the fact that a rule is one of the Ten Commandments is
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not a good reason for accepting it as a universal moral
rule. If the Ten Commandments has rules which are
not good, the fact that a rule is one of the Ten
Commandments doesn't tell you whether it is a good
one or a bad one. So we can see that the Ten
Commandments does not provide a universally
adequate moral guide. You will note that I have
shown the inadequacies of both the Golden Rule and
the Ten Commandments without saying the slightest
thing that is controversial. I have just told you what
you already know.
THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE
Having eliminated the two most popular
accounts of morality, I shall now mention one
philosophical account, perhaps the most famous one
of all, the Categorical Imperative, formulated by
Immanuel Kant, regarded by some as the greatest
philosopher of all time. The most popular
formulation of the Categorical Imperative is, "Act
only according to that maxim that you could thereby
will to be a universal law. " This can be paraphrased
as "Don't do anything you could not will everyone to
do." Kant shows how the Categorical Imperative
rules out lying promises. They are immoral because
you could not will that everyone make lying
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promises. If everyone knew that everyone was
lying when they promised, nobody would expect the
promise to be kept and then there would not really be
any promises. So the Categorical Imperative shows
you that lying promises are wrong. The Categorical
Imperative proves it, but we have already seen that the
Golden Rule correctly shows that you should not hit
your little brother and take away his toy and that some
of the Ten Commandments are genuine moral rules.
In order to provide an adequate moral guide,
the Categorical Imperative must classify as immoral
all and only those acts which really are immoral. If it
sometimes correctly tells you that an act is immoral,
e.g., making a lying promise, and sometimes
incorrectly tells you that an act is immoral, then it is
not better than these other popular guides. The
Categorical Imperative does seem to classify as
immoral acting on the maxim, "Never be the first to
arrive at a party." If everybody acted on that rule,
there could not be any parties, and so it seems just
like a maxim that allows lying promises. If one were
interested, many maxims could be invented that
would be impossible to make into universal laws, and
using the Categorical Imperative, Kant would have to
regard it as immoral to act on those maxims, but some
of them might, in fact, even be maxims that it would
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be good manners to follow, e.g., "Never be the last
to leave a party." It is impossible for everyone to act
on that maxim, someone has to be last. It is clearly
wrong to claim that acting on such a maxim is
immoral. So we can see that the philosophical slogan
is no better than the popular slogans in providing a
universally adequate moral guide.
This attack on the Golden Rule, the Ten
Commandments, and the Categorical Imperative is not
an attack on morality. It's an attack on simplistic
thinking about morality. It's an attack on the view
that you can summarize morality in a one sentence, or
maybe a ten sentence, slogan. It is amazing how
many people, when shown the inadequacy of these
slogans, conclude that morality has been shown to be
inadequate, that ethical relativity and skepticism are
the only possible positions. It is as if somebody,
when you give them Newton's three laws of physics,
concludes that since they are not completely adequate
and do not account for everything, that shows that
physics is inadequate.
To back up their sophistication about the
subjectivity of values, people often quote
Shakespeare's remark, "Nothing is good or bad, but
thinking makes it so." Of course, Shakespeare was
not a philosopher and besides, only a character says
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it, and so we don't know if Shakespeare believed it
or not. But a lot of people quote this remark as if it
proved that morality is subjective. It is amazing how
poorly people argue, how little they pay serious
attention to whether or not they hold inconsistent
views. What may make what I have said so far seem
at all controversial is that I have pointed out the
inconsistencies in views that people hold without ever
realizing that they hold such inconsistent views.
MORAL THEORY
A moral theory is an attempt to go beyond
slogans and to provide an adequate description of
morality, one that does not result in inconsistencies.
A good moral theory also shows how morality is
related to our more general values and to impartiality
and rationality. I have developed a moral theory
which I think accurately describes morality, the moral
system that we actually use when making moral
judgments and deciding what to do in moral
situations. What follows is based upon that theory,
which is presented in far greater detail in my book,
Morality: A New Justification of the Moral Rules,
published by Oxford University Press in 1988 and
now also available in paperback. (It may be relevant
to point out here that there is not necessarily a conflict
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between morality and self-interest).
GOODS, EVILS, and RATIONALITY
Before I talk about morality at all I want to say
something more about our general values, because
"moral values" is not a redundant phrase. There are a
lot of values besides moral values. I want to talk
about those things we consider to be goods and evils,
or benefits and harms, if you like that better. By an
evil or a harm, I simply mean something that you
would always avoid for your self or your friends
unless you had some reason for not avoiding it. I
define a good or a benefit in a similar way, as
something you would not avoid for yourself and your
friends unless you had some reason to. I claim that,
in the sense I have given to the terms, we all agree on
what the goods and evils are, i.e., we all have the
same basic values.
I have no argument at all for this claim. If you
do not agree with me all I can do is try to clarify. If
after I clarify and you understand and still disagree
with me, there is nothing else for me to do. I have
nothing further to say to you and you might as well
stop reading this essay. In order to test whether or
not there really is agreement, I am going to present the
list of basic evils, a list of things that rational people,
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including you and your friends, avoid unless you
have an adequate reason for not avoiding them. Here
is the list:
Death
Pain
Disability
Loss of Freedom
Loss of Pleasure.
These evils differ from almost everything else
in the world, because for anything else which does
not involve these evils, we do not need any, let alone
an adequate, reason for not avoiding them e.g.,
books.
If there is agreement on the evils, I do not
think there will be any problem in getting agreement
on the goods. Here is the list of goods (those things
you would not avoid unless you had an adequate
reason for doing so):
Abilities
Freedom
Pleasure.
The close relationship between the goods and
evils should be apparent. It should also be apparent
that we regard anyone who, without an adequate
reason, does not avoid the evils or does avoid the
goods as acting irrationally.
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In order to explain what counts as an adequate
reason we must fIrst make clear what a reason is. A
reason is a conscious belief that you or someone else
will avoid suffering an evil, or will gain a good. So if
you are acting rationally you wouldn't want to suffer
any of the items on the list of evils unless you or
someone else is going to avoid one of these evils or
gain some good. Everyone admits that acting so as to
avoid a good or not to avoid an evil when no one,
including yourself, is going to benefIt in any way is
irrational, e.g., killing yourself in order to make
someone else suffer. It is also clear that causing
yourself serious harm in order to gain some minor
good, e.g., cutting off your arm to win a quarter bet,
is also irrational. In order for your harming yourself
to be rational, the reason you have must be adequate,
i.e., the evil avoided or good gained must be equal to
or greater then the harm caused. For example, it is
not irrational to have your arm cut off in order to
avoid the very high risk of death that would come
from the spread of bone cancer in your unamputated
arm.
This account of goods, evils, and rationality is
really quite simple. We all agree that it may be
rational to seek death in order to avoid intense
permanent pain, e.g., some seriously ill people
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choose to die rather than continue to suffer such pain.
Other people who are willing to undergo such pain in
order to stay alive are also acting rationally. This
shows that my claim that we all agree on what is good
and evil is not a claim that we all agree on the ranking
of the goods and evils. All disagreement about goods
and evils is disagreement on the way we rank the evils
and goods, it is never disagreement on whether
something counts as a good or as an evil. When we
do cost-benefit analysis there is not disagreement on
whether something counts as a cost or as a benefit.
Although I do not claim that everybody agrees
on the ranking of the goods and evils, by and large
people tend to agree. A person who commits suicide
to avoid going to the dentist is acting irrationally. But
there are other times where one's illness and pain are
serious enough that it is not irrational to prefer death.
I cannot provide a procedure for ranking the goods
and evils. Insofar as there are disagreements I shall
not attempt to settle them because I do not want to say
anything controversial. I admit that we sometimes
disagree on what is better or worse, but claim that we
always agree on what is good and bad. This account
of what is a good and evil explains why we always
choose goods over evils and it also explains what it
means to say that we sometimes choose the lesser of
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two evils. We want to avoid both of them, but if we
are forced to suffer one of them, we choose the lesser
evil.
MORALITY
Once we see that there is complete agreement
on what counts as the fundamental goods and evils, it
may seem less implausible that there is also agreement
on morality. Remember that I regard it as implausible
that morality can be stated adequately in a single
sentence slogan. Indeed, you should not expect this
essay to provide a complete account of morality, for
morality can no more be adequately summarized in a
short essay than can physics or biology. Besides if it
did, you would have no reason to buy my book. But
I am going to present the broad outline of the moral
system we all use in making our moral judgments.
Morality is like grammar; we all use it but we
have difficulty in making it explicit. A philosopher is
like a grammarian. What he does is make explicit the
rules that we all use. What I am going to do is simply
to make explicit the moral system that you all in fact
use in making your moral judgments. I shall not say
anything new at all. You can test whether what I say
is correct by seeing if the outline that I give you is
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such that when you use it, it provides you with the
moral judgments you always make, assuming that
you are good moral people.
First, a moral system applies to all rational
people, i.e., it applies to everybody whom we hold
responsible for their actions. This means that it
applies not only to philosophy majors and college
graduates, but also to college freshmen and even high
school students. But if morality applies to everyone,
then a moral system has to be simple enough for
everyone to understand it. We cannot judge people
by a moral system if the system is so complicated that
people can't understand it. So, since we judge high-
school students, and even younger children, by a
moral system, this requires the moral system to be so
simple that even they can understand it. If anybody
presents a moral theory that results in a moral system
that requires one to take a philosophy class in order to
understand it, this is enough to show that the theory is
wrong. The theory could not be describing the moral
system we actually use in judging people.
Since everybody is supposed to act as
morality requires, i.e., to abide by the moral rules, we
blame and punish them when they do not. But we
never want anyone to act irrationally, so it cannot be
irrational for people to act as morality requires.
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Otherwise we would sometimes blame or punish
people for refusing to act irrationally. A system that
is understood by everyone to whom it applies and
which is not irrational for them to follow, is what I
call a "public system." Games are such public
systems, Le., the rules apply to all the players in the
game and all the players understand the rules and it is
not irrational for any of them to follow them.
Morality differs from other public systems in
at least one important way: it applies to all rational
persons. Whereas the rules of a game apply only to
the people playing, morality applies' to everyone.
Cheating is taken by many people to be the paradigm
case of an immoral action because cheating seems to
provide a model for all immoral action. But because
one can cheat only those with whom one is
participating in some shared activity, many
philosophers have falsely concluded that morality
applies only within a given society. Social contract
theory and ethical relativity both rest on making the
wrong analogy between cheating and morality.
Morality is universal and does not depend upon any
prior agreement, actual or hypothetical.
THE MORAL RULES
What are the rules of morality, Le., the public
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system that apply to all rational persons? What rules
would a rational person who wants to avoid the evils
want as part of a public system that applies to
everyone? I claim that people would agree on the
rules they would want to be part of a public system
that applies to everyone. A list of these rules contains
the following five rules:
Do not Kill
Do not Cause Pain
Do not Disable
Do not Deprive of Freedom
Do not Deprive of Pleasure.
Be sure to notice the close connection between
these rules and the items on the list of evils. These
first five rules just tell you "Don't cause anyone to
suffer an evil." Since you don't want to suffer an
evil, and you know that no other rational person does
either, if you are putting forward a public system that
applies to all rational persons, you obviously want
these rules to be included in that system.
These five rules are not the only moral rules.
There are, as luck and chance would have it, five
more rules. These second five rules are also related to
the evils, but less directly. I do not have the space
here to provide the arguments showing how
obedience to these rules is required for avoiding
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causing the suffering of evils, but I can recommend a
book that has all these arguments in it. Even without
consulting this book, I do not think anyone will be
surprised by any of the second five rules. This is the
list of the next five rules:
Don't Deceive
Keep Your Promise
Don't Cheat
Obey the Law
Do Your Duty--where Duty includes those actions
you are required to do by your job, your position,
your family, your circumstances, etc., e.g., a teacher
has a duty to show up for class.
These are the ten moral rules that all rational
persons would want to be part of the public system
that applies to all rational persons. No one should be
surprised by these ten rules. These are all obvious,
simple rules that everyone is supposed to follow
regardless of what their personal goal in life is.
Careful attention to these rules shows that they
primarily set limits on what one is morally allowed to
do. They do not provide a positive goal for life. This
is done by another part of the moral system, what I
call the moral ideals. But before I say anything about
moral ideals, I want to point out a few interesting
features of the moral rules.
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Notice that they are simple and general. They
can be understood by everyone. They are all
prohibitions, or can be stated as prohibitions, e.g.,
"Keep Your Promise" is exactly equivalent to "Don't
Break Your Promise." Everyone of those rules can
be stated as a prohibition and with no change in
meaning at all. What is not obvious from just looking
at them is that they all have exceptions. The moral
rules are not absolute, they have exceptions. They
are, however, universal--they apply to everyone.
Many people confuse universal and absolute. The
moral rules are universal, they apply to everyone, but
they are not absolute. They have exceptions, but
these exceptions are also universal. What are the
justified exceptions? Here, not surprisingly, people
may disagree somewhat, just as they disagree on the
ranking of the evils. In fact, it is this difference in the
ranking of the evils that accounts for most moral
disagreement when there is agreement on the facts.
But almost all moral disagreements are in fact
disagreements on the facts. Very seldom is there
disagreement on the facts, including estimates on the
probability of consequences, and disagreement on
what morally ought to be done. In my seven years as
a member of the Ethics Committee in a hospital, and
as a consultant on ethical problems, I have not run
across a single case, not one, where there was moral
disagreement which was not based upon disagreement
in the facts.
Philosophers tend to distinguish facts from
values and claim that we all agree on the facts and
disagree on the values. In my experience, the exact
opposite is true. We all agree on our values and
disagree about the facts. If you look carefully and
precisely at what are presented as examples of moral
disagreements, I think your own experience will
confIrm this claim. Take the example of Star Wars
vs. Disarmament. Is there any disagreement in
values? Does one side want to blow-up the world and
the other side save it? Of course not. Everyone
wants to save the world. One side thinks that Star
Wars will save it, the other side thinks that
disarmament will save it. They disagree about the
probable consequences of different courses of action,
or what the facts of the case are. They all have the
same values--namely avoiding the death and
destruction that will accompany any nuclear
exchange.
When people agree on the facts, they almost
always agree on when it's justifIed to break a moral
rule. This is because they agree that the justified
exception has to be a part of the public system. If you
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are going to break a moral rule you have to be willing
that everyone be publicly allowed to break the rule in
the same circumstances. That this sounds a little like
Kant's Categorical Imperative is not surprising for the
attraction of the Categorical Imperative is that it seems
to capture the kind of impartiality that morality
requires. This kind of impartiality does not require
that we break a moral rule only when we would will
that everyone actually break the rule in the same
circumstances. Rather it requires that we break the
rule only when we would be willing to publicly allow
that everyone break it.
Let us consider applications of the procedure
for justifying a violation of a moral rule that it can be
broken justifiably when one would be willing to
publicly allow everyone in the same circumstances, to
break that rule. First let us consider the question
whether one can cause pain to someone, just for fun?
Clearly not, for no rational person would be willing to
publicly allow anyone to cause pain to another simply
for the fun of it. But now consider whether one
would be willing to allow someone to cause pain to
another when it is necessary to do so to help them
avoid death, and they consent to your causing that
pain. Here it is clearly justifiable to break the moral
rule because every rational person would be willing to
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publicly allow everyone to break the moral rule
against causing pain to someone who gives consent
when it is done to save their life. This is so obvious
that it seems almost not worth saying. It is not
obvious that it is justified to cause pain when it it
necessary to save a person's life and they refuse
consent. Not all rational persons would agree to
publicly allowing violating the rule against causing
pain in these circumstances.
This explains why informed consent is so
important in the practice of medicine. Doctors are
breaking moral rules left and right, they are causing
pain and disability and taking away freedom all the
time. If what they do is not to count as immoral they
must be justified in doing it. When you break a moral
rule with regard to someone with their consent and for
their benefit, everyone agrees that it is completely
justified, because everyone would be willing to
publicly allow such violations of the moral rules.
Though we do not explicitly make use of the
procedure that I have outlined, one can see that it
explains not only all those cases that are clearly
justified violations; it also explains those cases where
people disagree on whether the violation is justified or
not. These are the cases in which impartial rational
persons can disagree on whether they would publicly
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allow such a violation. This summarizes what the
moral theory says about the rules and when it is
justified to violate them. I am aware that it may sound
unfamiliar, but I think that you can see that it is all
extremely simple and straightforward, that it simply
makes explicit the procedure that you all use all the
time.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ~
THE MORAL IDEALS
Now I am going to make explicit the moral
ideals. Moral ideals are those precepts that tell you to
help others, to prevent the suffering of pain and
disability etc. Following the moral ideals goes
beyond what is required by the rules, but that does
not mean that in a conflict between the rules and the
ideals, one should always follow the rules. For
example, everyone agrees that you can break a
promise to meet someone at the movies, if it is
necessary to save a life. The moral ideal of saving a
life justifies your breaking this moral rule. The moral
rules and moral ideals are both important, and
sometimes one should take precedence over the other,
sometimes the reverse. It depends on what rules and
ideals are involved. It depends on the particular
circumstances. But there is an important difference
between the rules and the ideals. The rules tell you
not to cause an evil, e.g., do not cause pain; the
ideals tell you to prevent or relieve evil being
suffered, e.g., relieve pain.
You will notice that the moral rules can be
obeyed with regard to all people, all of the time,
equally. You can obey the moral rules impartially
with regard to all people all the time, twenty-four
hours a day, seven day a week, fifty-two weeks a
year. You can obey them when you are alone on a
desert island, in fact, you cannot help but obey them
when you are alone on a desert island. The situation
is really different with regard to the moral ideals. You
cannot be following the moral ideals twenty-four
hours a day. You have to sleep sometime, and when
you are sleeping you are not following the moral
ideals. This is a significant difference between the
moral ideals and the moral rules, e.g., all of you
reading this essay are right now obeying all of the
moral rules, but none of you right now are obeying
any of the moral ideals. Reading this essay may lead
you to follow moral ideals, but right at this minute,
you are not following them, whereas you are obeying
all of the moral rules.
This difference between the rules and the
ideals leads to another difference: it is appropriate to
punish people for not obeying the moral rules, but it
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is not appropriate to punish them for not following the
moral ideals. When would you punish them? The
moral rules differ from the moral ideals in that the
moral rules should be enforced. When people say
that morality cannot be enforced, another one of these
wonderful slogans, they usually don't know what
they're talking about. Everybody believes in the
enforcement of the moral rules. It's only the moral
ideals that should not be enforced. In fact, the moral
rules are enforced by every criminal code in every
civilized society in the world. There are rules against
killing, causing pain, breaking promises, etc. To say
that you should not enforce morality is a slogan as
misleading as the slogans that I discussed at the
beginning of this essay. I suspect that as much
careful thought has been devoted to it as has been
devoted to the Golden Rule by those who regard it as
an adequate summary of morality or as a completely
satisfactory moral guide.
Morality is too important to be summarized in
tenns of slogans. But that slogans are inadequate to
summarize morality does not mean that only
philosophers can properly understand what morality
is. We all know what morality requires of us. It may
be that we are not all that anxious to get completely
clear about it.
------------------------------------31
Biography
Bernard Gert is Stone Professor of Intellectual
and Moral Philosophy at Dartmouth College. He
received his Ph.D. in 1962 from Cornell University.
He has been a visiting associate professor at The
Johns Hopkins University, and a visiting professor at
Edinburgh University and The Hebrew University of
Jerusalem. He has received the following fellowship
and awards: National Endowment for the Humanities
Fellowship (1969-70); National Endowment for the
Humanities - National Science Foundation Sustained
Development Award (1980-84); Fulbright Award -
Israel (1985-86).
Professor Gert is author of the following
books: The Moral Rules: A New Rational Foundation
for Morality (Harper Torchbook, 1975); Philosophy
In Medicine: Conceptual and Ethical Issues in
Medicine and Psychiatry (Oxford University Press,
1982), co-authored with Charles M. Culver; Morality:
A New Justification of the Moral Rules (Oxford
University Press, 1988); Man And Citizen by Thomas
Hobbes, edited with introduction (Doubleday Anchor,
1972).
32------------------------------------
CENTER PUBLICATIONS
VOLUMEI
o. 1, October, 1987
Ethical Norms in Science
Rachelle D. Hollander
National Science Foundation
o. 2, January, 1988
Ethics in Academia
Diether H. Haenicke
Western Michigan University
No.3, May, 1988
Thoughts on Keeping My Mouth Shut
David H. Smith
Poynter Center
Indiana University
o. 4, June, 1988
Affirmative Action Defended
Laurence Thomas
Oberlin College
VOLUMEII
o. 1, November, 1988
Biomedical Ethics in the Soviet Union
Richard DeGeorge
University of Kansas
o. 2,January, 1989
Do Professors Need Professional Ethics as Much as
Doctors and Lawyers?
James W. Nickel
University of Colorado
------------------------------------33
No.3, February, 1989
Ethical Dilemmas in Health Care: Is Society Sending
a Mixed Message?
John V. Hartline, M.D.
Neonatology, Kalamazoo Michigan
No.4, March, 1989
Codes of Ethics in Business
Michael Davis
illinois Institute of Technology
No.5, May, 1989
Should I (Legally) Be My Brother's Keeper?
Gilbert Geis
Univ. of Cal., Irvine
VOLUMEill
No.1, October, 1989
Surrogate Parenting: The Michigan Legislation
Lucille Taylor, Majority Counsel
Michigan State Senate
Paul Denenfeld, Legal Director
ACLU Fund of Michigan
No.2, December, 1989
Morality Versus Slogans
BemardGert
Dartmouth College
34-----------------------------------
Kim Rotzoll, Department of
Advertising, University of Illinois
ADVERTISING AND ETHICS: THE
INEVITABLE BATTLEGROUND
Tuesday,7:30 p.m., 3370 Knauss
WINTER 1990 PUBLIC PRESENTATIONS
Jan 16
Jan 22
Jan 23
Feb 1
Feb 7
Adrian Piper, WMU Martin Luther
King/Cesar Chavez/Rosa Parks
Visiting Scholar; Department of
Philosophy, Georgetown University
HIGHER ORDER
DISCRIMINATION
Monday, 7:30 p.m., 3770 Knauss
Adrian Piper
IMPARTIALITY, COMPASSION,
AND MORAL IMAGINATION
Tuesday,] :00 p.m., 3020 Friedmann
Martin Benjamin, Department of
Philosophy,
Michigan State University
MORALITY AND COMPROMISE
Thursday, 7:30 p.m., 3760 Knauss
HOSPITAL ETHICS FORUM
(A Panel Discussion) Moderator:
Eugene Grochowski, M.D.,
Bronson Methodist Hospital
Wednesday, 7:00 p.m., Fetzer Center
------------------------------------35
Feb 9
Feb 15
Feb 23
Feb 27
Mar 16
Roger Ulrich, Department of
Psychology, WMU
ETHICS IN ACADEME? ...AND
OTHER PREDICAMENTS OF
MODERN CIVILIZATION
Friday, 3:00 p.m., Faculty Lounge
Harriet Baber, Deparunent
of Philosophy, San Diego University
TWO MODELS OF PREFERE TIAL
TREATMENT FOR WORKING
WOMEN
Thursday,7:30 p.m., 3760 Knauss
Ellen W. Bernal, Nursing
and the Humanities, Medical College of Ohio
Patricia Hoover, Clinical
Professor of Nursing, Medical College
of Ohio
NURSING AUTONOMY
Friday, 3:00 p.m., 205 Bernhard Center
Frederick Reamer, School
of Social Work, Rhode Island College
ETHICS AND THE PROFESSIO S:
PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS
Tuesday, 7:30 p.m., 3770 Knauss
Gwen Raaberg, Director,
Women's Center, WMU
AN ETHICS OF CARING
Friday, 3:00 p.m., 3020 Friedmann
36-----------------------------------
Mar 22
Mar 29
Apr 5
Apr 17
Clifford Christians,
Institute of Communications Research,
University of Illinois
TELEVISION TECHNOLOGY AND
MORAL LITERACY
Thursday, 7:30 p.m., 3760 Knauss
Bernard Williams, Department of
Philosophy,
University of California at Berkeley
THE PLACE OF DECEIT IN
PUBLIC LIFE
Thursday, fJ:OOp.m., 3760 Knauss
Vivian Weil, Center for the Study
of Ethics in the Professions,
Illinois Institute of Technology
OWING AND CONTROLLING
INFORMA nON
Thursday, 7:30 p.m., 3760 Knauss
Raymond Alie, Department
of Management, WMU
INSIDER TRADING
Tuesday, 3:00 p.m., Red Room A,
Bernhard Center
------------------------------------37
Mar 22
Mar 29
Apr 5
Apr 17
Clifford Christians,
Institute of Communications Research,
University of Illinois
TELEVISION TECHNOLOGY AND
MORAL LITERACY
Thursday, 7:30 p.m., 3760 Knauss
Bernard Williams, Department of
Philosophy,
University of California at Berkeley
THE PLACE OF DECEIT IN
PUBLIC LIFE
Thursday, h:OOp.m., 3760 Knauss
Vivian Weil, Center for the Study
of Ethics in the Professions,
Illinois Institute of Technology
OWING AND CONTROLLING
INFORMA TION
Thursday, 7:30 p.m .. 3760 Knauss
Raymond Alie, Department
of Management, WMU
INSIDER TRADING
Tuesday, 3:00 p.m., Red Room A,
Bernhard Center
------------------------------------37
MEMBERSHIP 
Membership in the Ethics Center is open to anyone 
interested. There is no membership fee. 
====================================== 
Please enroll me as a member of the WMU Center 
for the Study of Ethics in Society. 
Name 
Mailing Address ___________ _ 
Institutional Affiliation _________ _ 
====================================== 
Send to: Center for the Study of Ethics in Society 
Western Michigan University 
Kalamazoo, Ml 49008 
The Center publishes papers of interest to its 
readers. Distribution is free to members. 
Additional copies may be obtained for $2.00 by 
writing to the Center. 
Lithograph on Front Cover: The Oaklands, Western 
Michigan University 
Center for the Study of Ethics in Society 
Western Michigan University 
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49008-3899 
